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SESSION 2
INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2018—Part IV: The United States in
International Procurement: Understanding
a Pause in the Trump Administration’s
Protectionism
Christopher R. Yukins
Professor of Government Procurement Law
George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
As the Trump administration came of age in 2018, two distinct developments marked the United States’ involvement in international procurement.
First, to the surprise of many, and despite a wave of other U.S. protectionist
measures aimed at strategic sectors such as steel and aluminum, the Trump
administration did not press forward aggressively on its promised “Buy American” initiatives in procurement. Second, the Trump administration remained
largely silent on an arguably protectionist initiative in the European Union,
the European Defense Fund, which gained ground in one of the United States’
most important defense markets abroad.
To address these two aspects of U.S. policy, this piece proceeds in five parts.
Part I reviews the Trump administration’s failure to move forward on the protectionist measures President Trump called for in the early days of his administration. In Part II, the piece discusses one of the possible causes for the Trump
administration’s reluctance to press for protectionism: a significant setback in the
NAFTA/USMCA negotiations, which may narrow the administration’s options
going forward. Part III reviews other potential causes for the Trump administration’s shift away from protectionism in procurement, including competing strategic concerns, new U.S. data on the relatively small threat posed by procurement
from abroad, and data from Europe which confirms that U.S. exporters have
much to lose were the European Union to take a retaliatory stance in European
procurement markets. Finally, Part IV reviews the European Defense Fund, an
initiative which surged forward in 2018 and which threatens to exclude U.S.
defense companies from important opportunities in Europe, despite reciprocal
defense procurement agreements which guarantee open markets in defense and
-- again surprisingly -- with no loud objections from the Trump administration.
Part V offers concluding remarks and a potential way forward.
I.	Buy American Initiative Now Muted in the Trump
Administration
At the start of the Trump administration, every indication was that the
new president would unleash a suite of protectionist measures in procure-
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ment. Those could have included any number of measures, from higher “Buy
American” price preferences, to tighter scrutiny of Buy American Act waivers, to protectionist measures in long-heralded legislation to rebuild public
infrastructure in the United States. E.g., Christopher R. Yukins, The Trump
Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement, 2017 Gov’t
Contracts Year in Rev. Br. 3. President Trump made a series of very public
statements in favor of a new protectionism in federal procurement, and he
issued Executive Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 21, 2017), which
called for data to be gathered for an administration study, to be submitted
in November 2017, on whether new protections might be erected around the
federal procurement market. Id. at 18838.
That Trump administration study on new “Buy American” measures never
materialized, and the data on Buy American waivers rest largely unnoticed
on the Federal Business Opportunities website, www.fbo.gov. (A GAO report
from December 2018, discussed below, offered the somewhat flat explanation
that, according to the White House, the data posted online -- which appear to
be data gathered under the Executive Order but never used -- allow “vendors
selling domestic products to more easily see how agencies acquire foreign
goods pursuant to Buy American Act exceptions.” GAO, Buy American Act:
Actions Needed to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting and Selected
Agency Guidance, GAO-19-17, at 10 (Dec. 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696086.pdf.)
The question, then, is why the lull -- why has the Trump administration
paused in pressing for new “Buy American” protections in U.S. procurement?
There are probably several good answers (beyond the political distractions dogging the Trump administration), including a surprising failure in the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a focus in negotiations on opening China and other major markets, and an emerging recognition
that -- at least at this point -- sound data suggest that it would be a mistake for
the United States to press for aggressive barriers to the U.S. procurement market.
The discussion below will address each of these possible explanations in turn.
II.

The USMCA Surprise: No Canada

The first explanation for the Trump administration’s quiescence may
have been a significant -- and surprising -- setback in the proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).1
In an unexpected turn, Canada ultimately refused to join Chapter 13 of the
USMCA, which addresses procurement. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: The U.S-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA): Some Surprising Outcomes in Procurement, 60 Gov. Contr. ¶ 308 (Oct. 10, 2018). As Jean
Grier noted in her blog, the “USMCA is the first U.S. free trade agreement
(FTA) to not include procurement commitments for all parties.” Jean Heilman
Grier, USMCA -- Modernized NAFTA: Procurement (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
trade.djaghe.com/?p=5174.
The Canadian government’s refusal to join the procurement chapter may
have stemmed from a very aggressive posture the United States took earlier
in the negotiations. The U.S. negotiators reportedly put forward a concept of
strict “reciprocity” -- that the U.S. procurement market would be opened only
to the extent that a trading partner could offer the same dollar-for-dollar access. See, e.g., Jean Helman Grier, NAFTA Procurement: Capping Access? (Oct.
4, 2017), https://trade.djaghe.com/?p=4351. Thus (in theory) the Canadian
government, with perhaps roughly one tenth of the annual procurement of
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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the U.S. government, see, e.g., Government of Canada, 2016 Purchasing Activity Report, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/
reports/contracting-data/2016-purchasing-activity-report.html,would gain
access to only one-tenth of the U.S. federal market.
This “strict reciprocity” would probably have been administratively unworkable; over any given year, it could have meant access swinging open and
shut to different trading partners at different times and at different levels
in a Rube Goldberg-type scheme, badly disrupting cross-border trade and
U.S. agencies’ ability to access best-value solutions abroad. See, e.g., Jean
Heilman Grier, NAFTA Procurement: Capping Access, supra. Strict reciprocity also could have shredded the traditional principles of comity and open
markets that have informed U.S. trade policy in procurement since World
War II -- the same principles that led to the WTO’s plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement, which now includes most industrialized nations.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 529 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002446.
Unsurprisingly, the Canadian negotiators reacted very negatively to “strict
reciprocity,” see, e.g., Jasso, Canada’s Lead NAFTA Negotiator Criticizes U.S.
Proposal as Freeland Heads to Washington, Globe & Mail, Feb. 13, 2018, and
Canada ultimately simply refused to join the USMCA’s procurement chapter. As a result, if the USMCA comes into effect, replacing NAFTA (an open
question, given shifting politics in the United States), procurement trade
between Canada and the United States instead will be governed by the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement, which Canada and the United States
joined long ago. Compared to current access under NAFTA, the GPA affords
U.S. vendors slightly narrower access to Canadian procurement markets. See
Jean Heilman Grier, USMCA, supra (“While U.S. suppliers will continue to
have access to the extensive procurement that Canada covers under the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), they will lose some benefits
accorded under the NAFTA, specifically relating to thresholds and coverage
of services.”). In sum, despite President Trump’s claim that the USMCA was
the “largest trade deal ever,” in procurement the agreement may have left
U.S. businesses in a weaker place -- and it left out an entire country, Canada.
The scuffle over “strict reciprocity” under the USMCA had two collateral
effects, both largely unforeseen.
First, the Canadian government’s refusal to join the USMCA procurement
chapter suddenly made it more difficult for the United States to leave the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement, despite broad public speculation that
the United States would prefer to abandon the plurilateral GPA in favor of
bilateral arrangements in which the United States would hold more negotiating leverage. As representatives of the U.S. automotive industry noted in their
comments on the USMCA, if “the Administration were to withdraw the U.S.
from the WTO/GPA, which is not inconceivable, U.S. exporters would have no
access to the Canadian government market.” Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods (ITAC-2), USMCA Report,
Addendum, at 2 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/AdvisoryCommitteeReports/ITAC_2_REPORT-Automotive_Equipment_and_Capital_Goods_Addendum.pdf. Thus, by retreating to rely solely
on the GPA for U.S.-Canadian procurement access, the Canadian government
significantly raised the stakes for the United States, were it to abandon the GPA.
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The second effect of the fight over “strict reciprocity” related to Mexico,
and may spell the end of “strict reciprocity” as a negotiating tool. A paper
published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce during the USMCA negotiations
reported that because in practice Mexican firms seldom exercise their right to
access U.S. public procurement under NAFTA, limiting procurement access
across the U.S.-Mexico border in a rigidly reciprocal manner under USMCA
could, in practice, sharply reduce U.S. firms’ existing (and much broader)
access to Mexican public markets. See, e.g., Murphy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Gutting NAFTA’s Procurement Rules Could Cost Americans Billions
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.uschamber.com/series/modernizing-nafta/guttingnafta-s-procurement-rules-could-cost-americans-billions. Possibly because
of this insight that “strict reciprocity” could in fact hurt U.S. exporters, the
final text of the USMCA did not provide for strict reciprocity in procurement
trade between the United States and Mexico. It is possible, too, that because
the USMCA negotiations laid bare the potentially adverse effects of “strict
reciprocity,” the idea has now died a quiet death.
III. Shifting Perspectives on Protectionism
There may be other, less immediately tangible reasons for the lull in the
Trump administration’s protectionism in procurement.
The Trump administration’s policy makers working in procurement appear to have pivoted to focus on securing the U.S. industrial base, and on
ensuring security of supply during times of conflict. A recent report to the
Defense Department highlighted the need to ensure security of supply, not
necessarily by excluding all foreign vendors, but instead by prudent assessments of risk in the supply chain. See Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment
of Executive Order 13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States
(Sept. 2018). Recent interim regulations issued by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (reviewed in John Barker’s accompanying piece) focus on ensuring that foreign investors cannot gain access,
through a procurement or otherwise, to sensitive U.S. technologies. Finally,
Section 885 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Public Law No. 115-232, called for new regulations to restrict foreign access
to U.S. technologies through procurement.
Moreover, the Administration’s broader trade policy is clearly aimed first
at opening major markets such as China’s, for example. As the Administration’s focus shifts to opening markets, the Administration may be reluctant
to rely too heavily on measures such as the Buy American Act, which can
readily close a U.S. market but may be too blunt a weapon to open target
markets abroad, at least in the near term. While the Buy American Act and
other protectionist measures are at the heart of U.S. trade strategy under
the Trade Agreements Act -- under the Act, the United States waives those
protectionist measures for countries that agree to open their own procurement markets -- in the near term (the timeline for a Trump administration
focused on reelection) new protectionist measures in procurement may not
do enough, quickly enough. New barriers to trade in procurement, such as
sharply increased price preferences for U.S. vendors, may be too slow to force
open specific foreign markets (such as the strategic Chinese market) or to
protect politically sensitive U.S. sectors (such as manufacturing).
The data available to the Trump administration’s policy makers also
may make protectionism in procurement seem a poor means of countering
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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a mammoth U.S. trade deficit. A recent study by the Government Accountability Office, noted above, concluded that only $7.8 billion, or less than 2%
of the approximately $500 billion in federal procurement each year, were
attributable to foreign end products. (The study did not attempt to estimate
the value of foreign-origin components or services.)

The GAO study, summarized in the chart above, found that of $508 billion in procurement (much of which were in services), $196 billion were in
end products that could be subject to the Buy American Act. Of those, only
$7.8 billion (4% of all end products purchased, and 1.5% of all procurement
in FY2017) were end products of foreign origin. (The GAO report also found
that these data were generally consistent with prior years’ data.) Of the $7.8
billion in foreign end products, roughly half were for use outside the United
States (and thus exempt from the Buy American Act), approximately a third
were from “qualifying countries” (i.e., subject to reciprocal defense procurement agreements, discussed below), and only $550 million (roughly .1% of
all procurement) were admitted under trade agreements. In practical terms,
this meant:
•

Overall, foreign-source supplies are only a very small part of U.S.
procurement, and eliminating them entirely -- by barring federal
agencies from using any foreign goods in the United States, for
example -- would cover only roughly $4 billion in goods and thus
would have no discernible impact on the overall U.S. trade deficit
(which in 2017 was $566 billion), and could compromise U.S. agencies’ abilities to achieve their missions when foreign goods provide
the best value.

•

Dismantling free trade agreements, such as the GPA, likely would
have only a tiny effect in increasing federal agencies’ purchases
of U.S.-made goods.

•

Reciprocal defense procurement agreements -- as noted below, a
cornerstone to open defense trade -- played a much more important role than traditional free trade agreements in opening U.S.
procurement markets.

Notably the GAO study did not attempt to assess the impact that new
protectionist measures might have on U.S. exporters’ access to foreign procurement markets. The GAO study showed, for example, that European nations
are leading sources of the foreign end products purchased by federal agencies,
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id. at 41, but did not assess what impact new protectionist measures might
have on U.S. exporters, were (for example) the European Union to retaliate
against U.S. protectionism.
Data published by the European Commission on larger, reported awards
suggest that U.S. exporters have very favorable access to European procurement markets, both in direct sales and in indirect sales (through European
entities). See European Commission, Measurement of Impact of Cross-Border
Penetration in Public Procurement (Feb. 2017), https://publications.europa.eu/
en/publication-detail/-/publication/5c148423-39e2-11e7-a08e-01aa75ed71a1/
language-en. The European Commission’s data show that the United States
is consistently the leading non-EU exporter to the European Union’s procurement markets, in both direct and indirect procurement sales, and in both
numbers of contract actions and value. Id. at 41 & 43. The Commission’s data,
id. at 48, also show that U.S. companies win 3.8% of all the direct awards
studied (a figure which compares favorably to all foreign end products awards
in the U.S. system (see above)), and fully 21.8 % of all indirect awards (i.e.,
awards through European subsidiaries), id. at 49. While the finer points of
the European Commission’s data have been contested by U.S. officials, the
data at least indicate that U.S. companies have a strong foothold in European
public procurement markets -- a market position that could be imperiled were
U.S. protectionism to trigger European retaliation.
There is another type of economic analysis just over the horizon: econometric analyses of the broader, economy-wide impacts of protectionist measures.
These econometric studies do not yet shape the public debate, but are likely to
become much more relevant to policy assessments. The European Commission
is spending millions of Euros constructing a database which will allow policy
makers to analyze, in stark empirical terms, the direct and indirect costs of new
barriers to procurement trade. See generally Lucian Cernat & Zornitsa KutlinaDimitrova, International Public Procurement: From Scant Facts to Hard Data,
DG TRADE Chief Economist Notes 2015-1 (Directorate General for Trade, European Commission), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/dgtcen/2015_001.html. Many
of the costs of protectionism, such as efficient supply chains disrupted by inefficient preferences, traditionally have been too obscure to capture or measure;
the European Commission’s initiative aims to remedy that. The Commission’s
initiative builds on an earlier study at Victoria University (Australia), which
drew on econometric data regularly used by U.S. agencies to conclude that the
“Buy America” preferences in U.S. law (preferences which go, for example, to
federally funded transportation procurement) cost hundreds of thousands of
lost U.S. jobs. See Peter B. Dixon, Maureen T. Rimmer & Robert G. Waschik,
Macro, Industry and Regional Effects of Buy America(n) Programs: USAGE
Simulations, Victoria University, Melbourne Centre of Policy Studies Working
Paper No. G-271 (April 2017), http://www.copsmodels.com/ftp/workpapr/g-271.
pdf. These types of probing econometric studies may well reshape how policy
makers think about protectionism in procurement for decades to come.
All of the foregoing help explain why the Trump administration has
seemed to pivot in its approach to protectionism in procurement, to step
back from an early emphasis on “Buy American” measures. What they do
not explain, however, is why the Trump administration has remained largely
acquiescent in an important new initiative in the European Union, the European Defense Fund, which threatens to undermine U.S. market dominance
in defense and appears to contradict longstanding reciprocal agreements to
open defense markets on either side of the Atlantic.
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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IV. European Defense Fund Moves Forward, Without
Real Resistance
The European Defense Fund, originally launched in 2016, advanced
markedly in 2018, and in December 2018 the European Parliament approved
billions of Euros in new funding. See European Parliament Votes to Give EUR
13 Billion Subsidy to Arms Companies via European Defence Fund, Targeted
News Serv., Dec. 13, 2018 (available on Westlaw). The European Development
Fund would provide support for joint efforts among European defense firms
to develop and produce defense materiel. Under a European regulation put
forth in 2018, no support would be available for firms based, or run by those,
outside the European Union. See Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment:
European Commission Proposes Expanding The European Defence Fund—A
Major Potential Barrier To Transatlantic Defense Procurement, 60 Gov. Contr.
¶ 196 (2018).
The European Defense Fund thus appears to contradict the U.S. Defense
Department’s many reciprocal defense procurement agreements with its European allies. See Department of Defense, Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy, Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of
Understanding, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html; see DFARS DFARS 226.872. Those
European nations, among other allies known as “qualifying” countries, generally enjoy free access to U.S. defense procurements, including for research
and development, and in return U.S. defense firms are to enjoy reciprocal
access to the allied countries’ defense markets. See, e.g., Christopher Yukins
& Daniel Ramish, Feature Comment, Section 809 and ‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By
Cutting Bid Protests In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption,” 60 Gov. Cont. ¶ 138 (May 2,
2018) (discussing agreements). Those reciprocal agreements to open defense
markets have helped the United States become a leading arms provider in
Europe, and have helped secure close cooperation in defense procurement
between the United States and its European allies.
In light of that longstanding tradition of open and cooperative defense
procurement across the Atlantic, the European Defense Fund seems an
anomaly -- an oddly protectionist gambit by the European Union despite
subdued concerns from the U.S. defense community (and others) that the
Defense Fund violates standing requirements for open procurement. See,
e.g., European Defence Fund Could Be Breaching European Treaties, Legal
Opinion Says, EurActiv, Dec. 14, 2018 (“None of our initiatives, including
the [European Defense Fund], change the procurement rules in defence in
Europe,” Jorge Domecq, chief executive of the European Defence Agency,
told a defence industry summit in Brussels in early December. “We hear a
lot about this from our American allies, for example, but it is fake news.”)
(available on Westlaw); Creating European Defence Fund Would Breach EU
Treaty & Further Undermine Irish Neutrality, 2018 WLNR 38761983 (Sinn
Fein Member of the European Parliament Matt Carthy “has condemned the
vote of the European Parliament this week in favour of establishing a European Defence Fund (EDF), while welcoming the publication of a legal opinion
which finds that the creation of an EDF would be in breach of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union.”) (available on Westlaw). The progress made by the European Defense Fund, and the Trump administration’s
failure to complain, may be due to a number of factors.
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The first and most obvious is the desire of many European nations, prodded
by President Trump, to spend more on their own defense. See, e.g., Michael
Barnier, Europe’s Future Is Up To Us, Project Syndicate, Jan. 4, 2019; David
M. Herszenhorn, How to Improve Europe’s Military Defense, POLITICO, Dec.
7, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/working-group-berlin-how-to-improveeuropes-military-defense/. The European Defense Fund is intended to help
integrate a very fragmented European defense industry, because the Fund will
provide development funding only if the new efforts involve multiple Member
States. While this new funding may address President Trump’s complaints
that the European states do not spend enough on defense, limiting the new
funding to European firms seems to contradict the reciprocal defense agreements described above. That, in turn, may reflect a new assertiveness in
European policy, an overt desire to challenge the “bullying” that Europeans
perceive from the Trump administration in foreign trade (and defense). E.g.,
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies -- Policy
Department, Consequences of US Trade Policy on EU-US Trade relations and
the Global Trading System (2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2018/603882/EXPO_STU(2018)603882_EN.pdf.
But while all of that explains the Europeans’ actions, none of it explains
why the Trump administration has offered only muted concerns about the
European Defense Fund. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, U.S. Revives Concerns
About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies, N.Y Times, Feb. 18,
2018. Although that acquiescence from Washington may be due to U.S. willingness to overlook European protectionism in order to encourage enhanced
European defense spending, there may be a more fundamental obstacle to
engagement. While the Trump administration has been very publicly engaged
in opening foreign markets and protecting domestic industries, it has largely
overlooked the third, diplomatic element of foreign trade: to use trade as
leverage for stronger, more secure relationships between nations. It is that
third aspect of foreign trade policy -- comity and cooperation -- that is directly
threatened by the European Defense Fund’s overtly exclusionary structure.
Having largely set aside comity and cooperation in foreign trade, however,
the Trump administration may simply lack the voice to complain pointedly
about the emerging European Defense Fund.
V.

Conclusion

This past year was clearly one of flux, and the coming year may see further
changes. President Trump may be swept up in political and legal challenges,
which could derail his foreign trade initiatives; at the same time, though,
those challenges may prompt his administration to redouble its protectionist
initiatives, and to include procurement markets in those efforts. While those
next steps are unclear, what is clear is that there are sound historical and
empirical reasons to steer away from protectionism in procurement, and to
reclaim the comity and cooperation that helped shape the world economic
order in the decades after World War II -- an economic order that, until very
recently, included progressively opening markets in procurement.
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In his accompanying piece, Paul Lalonde discusses the USMCA from a Canadian
perspective, and explains that the Canadian government refers to the agreement
by the acronym “CUSMA,” for “Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement.”
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